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CASE COMMENTS
ADvERsE PossEssioN-M-NS AND MINERAL-CONTnUUrry OF PossESSIoN.--A owned certain tracts of coal which had been severed in situ
from the surface by prior conveyance, the surface being owned by B.
For several Years B trespassed upon A's property and mined cbal therefrom, mining during the winter months only. A brought this action
against B to recover for coal mined, and to enjoin B from further
operations. B's defense was adverse possession. Held, 1. The statute
of limitations does not run in favor of one making occasional entries
upon land and mining coal during winter months. 2. Nor does it run
in favor of the owner of the surface as against mining rights previously conveyed. Prewitt v. Bull, 234 Ky. 18, 27 S. W. (2d) 399.
In order to establish the defense of adverse possession the possession must be actual, open, notorious, continuous, adverse and peaceable. Continuity of possession is an essential requirement. "That possession is continuous if the operations are continuous, or are carried
on continuously at such seasons as the nature of the business and
the customs of the country permit. . . ." Asher v. Gibson, 198 Ky.
285, 248 S. W. 862. And in McPherson v. Thompson, 203 Ky. 35, 261
S. W. 853, "The adverse possession of a coal mine can be maintained
only by the actual holding of the mine or seam of coal in actual possession, continuously, and uninterruptedly for the full statutory period,
and if it be abandoned for any period of time or the adverse holders
cease for a period to operate it as a mine and to so use it for the
purpose of taking coal . . . " the running of the statute is terminated.
Continuity of possession as an element of adverse possession is
required by all of the states. Holtzman. v. Douglas, 168 U. S. 278, 18
S. Ct. Rep. 65; Gordon v. Park, 202 Mo. 236, 100 S. W. 621; Huss V.
Jacobs, 210 Pa. 145, 59 Atl. 991. If an interruption occurs in the possession, and the acts of dominion are later resumed, the limitation
period runs from the time of such resumption. Old South Society V.
Wainwright, 156 Mass. 115, 30 N. E. 476.
The ownership of the surface may be distinct from that of the
minerals. When the separation has occurred we have two separate but
adjoining closes, and ownership of the surface does not carry with it
ownership of the minerals. Ky. Statutes, Sect. 2366a (Act of 1906).
Farnsworth v. Barrett, 146 Ky. 556, 142 S. W. 1049, says that the same
result obtained prior to 1906 by the common law "which holds that
possession of the surface does not give possession of the mining rights
which had been sold, but, on the contrary, presumes that the holder
of the surface was only a trustee, and held possession for the benefit
of the owner of the mineral. . . ." This seems well settled in Kentucky. Asher v. Gibson, supra; McPherson v. Thompson, supra.
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"In order to acquire title by adverse possession of minerals in
place which have been separated from the surface the possession must
be open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted as well as actual
and adverse." McPherson v. Thompson, supra. This is substantially
the rule adhered to in other jurisdictions. Vance v. Clark, 164 C. C. A.
411, 252 Fed. 495; Hooper v. Bankhead, 171 Ala. 632, 54 So. 549; Gordon
v. Park, supra; Armstrong v. Caldwell, 53 Pa. 284.
L. B. R.
C NSITrruTIONA I,-TEBPRPTIox.-Lieutenant Governor held to be
an executive officer.
This was an action to test the constitutionality of an act of the
General Assembly, in creating an "Appointing Board" to appoint members of the Highway Commission, such board to be composed of the
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General. The controversy concerns solely the Lieutenant Governor and the nature of his
office, whether legislative or executive. It is conceded that as to the
Governor and Attorney General there is no objection. The plaintiffs
in this case claim that the Lieutenant Governor is a legislative officer,
and as such, cannot exercise duties of an executive nature, of which,
clearly, is the power of making appointments, and that the act investing him with such power is unconstitutional because violative of
sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution, which separates the
powers of government into three divisions and adjures continued separation. The defendants claim that the office is executive and the act
consequently constitutional. The court held for the defendants with
Judge Willis dissenting. Rouse v. Johnson, 234 Ky. 473.
To the fact, that there is such an obvious answer, is due, no doubt,
the novelty of the question. As far as we have been able to discover,
just exactly In what department of government the Lieutenant Governor belongs has never been decided. We are so accustomed to consider
the Lieutenant Governor, merely because of the similarity of names,
as so closely akin to the Governor, that to admit of any great disparity
in the nature of their offices seems a palpable absurdity. Then too,
the Idea of his succession to the gubernatorial office supports this view.
It is possible that some such background as this influenced the court
in its decision.
However, the court, in this case, based its opinion on more than
mere association of ideas. In the first place, says the majority, the
Constitution makes the Lieutenant Governor an executive officer, by
creating his office under the general heading of "Executive Department," and in proximity to the place of creation of undoubted executive offices. The court thus intimates that the Constitution, by this
classification, declares that the Lieutenant Governor shall be an executive officer. But, can we reasonably conclude that any such interpretation as this ought to be given to what admittedly may be no more
than the publisher's divisions? We think not. The dissenting judge
shows that no such consistent, mechanical, theory of classification is
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maintained in that instrument; mechanical nomenclature is unimportant and immaterial. The Constitution is divided merely for the
sake of convenience and to make the whole less cumbersome. Adamantine strictness is neither practical nor desirable. As Judge Willis
points out, we have here no question! simply of terminology, of names,
of titles, or of classification, but a question of the survival of and
obedience to that basic and vital precept, inherent In our political
system, the tripartite separation of the powers of government. It is
not a quibble, nor a lexicographer's conundrum, but a real struggle
for a fundamental principle of American government.
The majority opinion then presents several minor discussions and
finally admits that the conclusive test of the character of the
office is determined by the nature of the duties performed. This maxim
is too well settled to be impugned. So, the court attempts to show that
the duties, or rather the "primary duties," as it puts it, are executive.
His primary duties, it says, are to perform the duties and functions of
Governor, if that official dies, resigns, or etc., and that he is President
,of the Senate and performs legislative duties only "by virtue of his
office" of Lieutenant Governor; his primary duties are to act as Governor in the event that he dies. May not the use of the words "primary
duties" be questioned? The Lieutenant Governor never performs a
single executive act, as Lieutenant Governor. He only performs executive acts after he has become Governor, with all the rights and powers
of Governor, not of Lieutenant Governor; with all the functions of
Governor; with the salary of Governor; with the name and position
of Governor. While he is Lieutenant Governor, he is nothing but the
President of the Senate. Not only his primary duties, but all his duties
are such by virtue of his being the presiding officer of the upper house
of the General Assembly. All his work is done in that chamber. His
salary is the same as that of a Senator. The Constitution declares that
he shall, when the Senate is in the committee of the whole, debate
and vote on all subjects, and shall, in the event of a tie, cast the deciding vote. All these are lawmaking duties, which is to say, legislative
duties. He makes laws, which is, indeed, the very definition of a legislative officer.
Since this question is a novel one, the weakness and even absolute lack of authority is not surprising. We are convinced, after a
careful examination of the cases cited, that there is not a single case,
which even inferentially supports the position taken in this case.
There is in the dissenting opinion, however, one case which deserves
interested consideration, the case of Springer v. The Philippine IslanO,
277 U. .. 189. It actually does raise the point under discussion in the
present controversy, and holds that the presiding officer of a legislative body is himself a. legislative officer. We think that even this
case is weakened somewhat by the fact that, in the Philippine legislature, with which this case is concerned, the President of the Senate
is actually a member of the Senate, being elected from that body
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proper, by Its members. If the court in that case considered the
President of the Senate a legislative officer by reason of the fact that
he is a member of the Senate, the authority is practically worthless,
but, if it considered him such by virtue of his presiding, the case is
directly in point, and its authority undeniable.
Regardless however of particular authority, which, as we have
said, seems to be of little value in this decision, it seems to us that
there Is something in favor of the dissent. A legislative officer cannot
perform executive duties; the Lieutenant Governor, being a lawmaker,
is a legislative officer, therefore, he cannot exercise the executive duties
H. T. W.
of making appointments to carry out that law.
CONTRACTS-CoNsIDERnATIoN-FonEBEARANCn

TO SuE.-Son of defend-

ant, a minor, ran Into plaintiff with a bicycle, causing injury. Defendant promised to pay for necessary medical attention in consideration of plaintiff not suing defendant for damages. H eld, good consideration, since plaintiff had reasonable grounds for doubt as to
validity of her claim. Forsythe v. Rexroat, 234 Ky. 173, 27 S. W. (2d)
695.
"No rule of law is better settled than that an agreement to forbear proceedings at law or in equity to enforce a well-founded claim
is a sufficient consideration to support a promise. . . " 5 R. C. L.
890. The early English cases did not differentiate claims except to
classify them as either good or bad. The question of reasonableness
did not gain the courts' attention. A promise to forbear a baseless
claim was insufficient consideration. Barnard v. Simons, 1 Rolle's
Abr. 26, pl. 36; Loyd v. Lee, 1 Strange 94. (Williston's Cases on Contracts, p. 238.) This strict rule was modified later in Longridge v.
Dorville, 5 B. & Ald. 117, where forbearance on a doubtful claim was
held good. Afore recent English cases go further to say that forbearance is valid consideration if the claim is honestly asserted and not
wholly unreasonable. Many courts in the United States have taken to
this more liberal rule, while others hold to the older view that the
claim must be reasonably doubtful in fact or law. Williston's Treatise
on Contracts, student edition, sec. 135; Restatement of the Law of
Contracts, appen., sec. 76.
The Restatement says in section 76(b): "The surrender of, or forbearance to assert an invalid claim or defense by one who has not
an honest and reasonable belief in its possible validity" is insufficient
consideration.
The principal case adopts the view that the claim must be reasonably doubtful to make forbearance a valid consideration. To quote
from the case: "Good faith or an honest belief in its soundness alone
Is not enough." This is the rule in Kentucky. Berry v. Berry, 183 Ky.
481, 209 S. W. 855; Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Quinn, 130 Ky.
397, 113 S. W. 456; Hardin's Admr. v. Hardin, 201 Ky. 310, 256 S. W.
417; Sellers v. Jones, 164 Ky. 458, 175 S. W. 1002; Cline & Co. v. Temple-
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ton, 78 Ky. 550;*Crentz v. Heil, 89 Ky. 433, 12 S. W. 926; Robb v. Sherl-Russell Lumber Co., 194 Ky. 835, 241 S. W. 64.
It Is submitted that the Kentucky courts line up with the better
view in requiring reasonable grounds for doubt as well as honesty in
belief. Some premium should be put on a fair use of intelligence and
some check on fraud.
J. C. B.
Con oRATioxs-FRAuD oF P o0T -BANs rx NE0oorABrma INSTuMETs.-Hatcher and Powers were promoters of the corporation. Before it was incorporated, appellee signed the subscription for capital
stock, leaving the number of shares blank, and delivered it to Hatcher
and Powers. They filled it in for six shares and turned it over to the
corporation.
After the corporation was organized, it was forced to liquidate by
reason of financial difficulties. Appellee was sued on his unpaid stock
subscription. His first answer was that he subscribed for six shares,
but that he was not to pay for them. After about three years, he
changed his answer and said his agreement was to take one share, and
that it was left blank for the promoters to fill in and specify whether
it was to be common or preferred stock.
The chancellor found the latter answer to be a fact, and Judgment
was given against appellee for the value of one share. On appeal the
court did not disturb the chancellor's finding of fact, but reversed the
judgment and held appellee liable to pay for the six shares instead of
one. Hatcher-Powers Shoe Co. v. Kirk, 233 Ky. 19, 24 S. W. (2d) 903.
The court said that the promoters were the agents of the subscriber to fill in the blanks and that they were not the agents of the
corporation. They cited Thompson on Corporations, Vol. 2, Sec. 818,
which says: "The general rule is that. subscriptions procured on false
or fraudulent representations of promoters cannot be avoided after the
corporation is organized; also, the Kentucky case of Oldham v. Mt.
Sterling Improvement Co., 103 Ky. 529, which says: "A corporation is
not responsible for representations made by its promoters. They cannot bind it as its agents."
Ballantine on Private Corporations, Sec. 44, says, the above is the
minority view, and states with cases cited in support: "A subscription
induced by fraudulent representations of directors, agents or promoters of a corporation is voidable at the election of the subscriber,
and he may recover what he has paid within a reasonable time unless
the right of creditors has intervened." In view of the authorities and
the cases cited in support, this is the modern majority rule on this
question of fraud of agents and promoters.
The court said that the promoters in this case were without
doubt
the agents of appellee to fill in the blank, and the fact that they exceeded their authority in filling it out for six shares, did not make
it voidable because appellee by his signature set in motion that which
made himself or a third party lose, and he must bear the loss. The
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promoters, not being agents of the corporation, did not bind it, and
it was considered an innocent third party.
In support of this reasoning, the court referred to the rule of
negotiable instruments which is that the holder of a paper not fully
made out has the prima facie authority to fill in the blanks, and
when such a paper has passed in due course, the maker is liable for
the amount filled in.
The soundness of such an analogy is very doubtful. The rule as
to negotiable instruments is made to expedite commerce by removing
all defenses from the paper so that it may pass freely as negotiable
paper. No need appears to make stock subscriptions bear the character
of negotiable instruments, and it is contrary to the majority view to
give them such a status and refuse the defense of fraud of the promoter In securing the subscription.
Upon general principles, it seems that the court reached the proper
result in this case, but on questionable grounds. The ground upon
which appellee could be held liable is estoppel. The theory of this
ground is that, having signed the subscription in blank and given the
promoters authority to fill in the blank, he ought to be estopped from
saying that they exceeded their authority as a defense in an action
against him on his unipaid subscription.
This Is consistent with the majority rule and Ballantine on Corporations, Sec. 44, which says the subscriber who has been defrauded
must act promptly to get a rescission of his subscription. This view is
expressed in the case of Silvain v. Benson, 145 Pac. 175, 83 Wash. 271,
and cases there cited, which holds that one signing a corporate stock
subscription list is held estopped from denying the authority of the
promoter to fill in the blanks for the amount of the subscription.
G. B. F.
Cimns-VERDIcT AGAINST EvwumEN.-Defendant charged In an
indictment for murder with having recklessly, etc., driven his auto
against deceased, testified, as the only eyewitness, that he was driving
S0 miles per hour, that deceased saw him when he was 1,000 feet away,
and that she stepped directly in front of his car. The jury found him
guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The appellate court, asserting its
reluctance to interfere with the finding of a jury, and saying that it
would not Interfere where the evidence was conflicting, reversed the
finding on the exclusive ground that the verdict was palpably against
the evidence. Haupe v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 27, 27 S. W. (2d) 394.
This decision presents the question as to when the reviewing court
may set aside the verdict of a jury. In Kentucky the rule that the
appellate court will not disturb the finding of a jury where the evidence is conflicting, unless the verdict is flagrantly against the evidence, has been so often repeated that it assumes the character of a
platitude. Risner v. Commonwealth, 229 Ky. 486, 17 S. W. (2d) 401.
It Is also quite clear that in such cases, the reviewing court must
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construe evidence most favorably to the Commonwealth. Wood v. Conmonwealth, 229 Ky. 568, 17 S. W. (2d) 443. In Nelson v. Commonwealth, 232 Ky. 568, 24 S. W. (2d) 276, the court enunciated still another principle to be observed while reviewing a verdict when it said:
"Since the credibility of the witnesses is for the jury, its verdict will
not be set aside on the ground that it is flagrantly against the evidence, even though the numerical weight of the testimony favors the
accused, unless such testimony is strongly corroborated by the physical
facts and circumstances."
The reluctance of the court to reverse a conviction because it is
flagrantly against the evidence has been expressed in numerous cases.
Copeland v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 286, 287 S. W. 721; Todd v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 379, 242 S. W. 36; Hutchcraft v. Commonwealth,
195 Ky. 591, 242 S. W. 580. There will be no hesitation, however, in
reversing a verdict when there are irrefragable signs of prejudice and
passion as the influences motivating the verdict. Combs v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 199, 256 S. W. 4. The criterion used to determine when
a verdict is flagrantly against the evidence was stated in Mclurry v.
Commonwealth, 205 Ky. 211, 265 S. W. 630: "We are authorized to
reverse a judgment as being flagrantly against the evidence only when
it appears that it was so much against the weight of the evidence as
to shock the conscience and to clearly appear that it was the result of
passion or prejudice on the part of the jury."
The difficulty in formulating rules to apply in all cases readily
presents itself, in view of the fact that this, like many other legal
questions, involves a matter of degree. "There is a twilight zone between suspicion and reasonable inference. . . . As each state of
facts is presented, the court, in the exercise of its best judgment, and
guided by precedent, must measure the evidence and decide in that
particular case whether it rises above the mere creation of suspicion
and places the facts in the zone of probative evidence and reasonable
inference." Ceo. T. Wood. Jr., v. Commonwealth, 229 Ky. 459, 17 S. W.
(2d) 443. The position of the court is more emphatically stated In
Barry v. Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 778, 280 S. W. 118: "And where there
is any evidence conducing to establish the guilt of the defendant it Is
not the province of the Court of Appeals to disturb the verdict. Indeed,
in no case will it do so, unless the verdict be wholly without support
C. S.
from or is flagrantly against the evidence."
TRTAL PRAcTicE--D RcTED VEDIC--SonqrxaLA Rut.-The overwhelming weight of evidence relative to an injury to the plaintiff's
eye negatived conclusively his allegation of negligence on the part
of defendant railroad. Yet, one witness, a car inspector, testified that
a car in the passing train had been reported by him on the date of
the accident as defective in its roof, and this defect could have caused
the injury, and was the only defect that was found in the train. But
the report he made was dated the day before the injury occurred, and
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as the accident happened two years before the trial, it is highly
probable that he was mistaken in the date of inspection, and other
reports and records of the defendant company tended to show that he
was in fact mistaken. The defendant made a motion for a peremptory
Instruction, which was overruled, and that ruling was assigned as
error. The case was tried under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
45 U. S. C. A., Secs. 51-59. Held, error to overrule defendant's motion.
L. & N. R. . Co. v. Grant, 234 Ky. 211, 27 S. W. (2d) 960.
The Federal and general rule in regard to directed verdicts is
that "When the evidence given at the trial, with all the inferences
that the jury could justifiably draw from it, is insufficient to support
a verdict for the plaintiff, so that such a verdict, if returned, must be
set aside, the court is not bound to submit the case to the jury, but
may direct a verdict for the defendant." Del v. R. R. Co., 31 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 617, at 620, 55 L. Ed. 590, 220 U. S. 580. "In Federal courts the
judges are no longer required to submit a case to the jury merely because some evidence has been introduced by the party having the
burden of proof unless the evidence be of such a character that it
would warrant the jury to proceed in finding a verdict in favor of the
party introducing the evidence." 2 Thompson on Trials, See. 2248.
In other words, there must be a substantial amount of evidence, of
some legal effect; the actual amount, and the tests proposed vary as
widely as the jurisdictions from which come the supporters of the
more sensible and generally followed rule.
Kentucky and a few other states, adhere to the so-called "Scintilla
Rule" in the matter of evidence produced when there is a motion for
a directed verdict. "If there is some evidence, howevr slight, which
supports the plaintiff's cause, the issue must go to the jury." Dailey v.
Lexington and Eastern R. R. Co., 180 Ky. 668, 203 S. W. 569. "The
court may, however in the exercise of judicial discretion, set aside a
verdict flagrantly and palpably against the evidence," is added as a
corollary of the rule. A slight modification of this rule is found in the
later case of Broyles v. Able, 208 Ky. 672, 271 S. W. 1040, where the
court says that "Evidence, within the rule requiring questions of fact
to be submitted to the jury, if supported by a scintilla of evidence, is
something of substance," meaning that it must be real evidence,
capable of belief and enough to support the verdict. When the court
goes that far, it is suggested that it will not be long until the thinning
ranks of adherents to the scintilla rule of evidence has lost another.
Thompson in his work on Trials, sections 2247-8-9, says that it is altogether overthrown in all the courts of England, in all the Federal
courts, and in most of the states.
A Maine court, in Conner v. Giles, 76 Me. 132, in overthrowing the
scintilla rule says, in part: "There is no object in permitting a jury
to find a verdict which the court must set aside as often as found. The
better rule Is to see if there be any evidence upon which a jury can,
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In any justifiable view, find for the party producing It, upon whom
the burden of proof Is imposed."
J. H. C
EviDENC---WITNEssEs, TESTIFYING By ATToRNEYs.-Accused was
being held for the murder of his grandmother. He was faced with circumstances evidencing his guilt, and for two days was kept under the
eyes of detectives and the Commonwealth attorney for the purpose of
getting a confession from him. He made no absolute confession, but he
asked the Commonwealth attorney if he would let him plead guilty
and see that he got life imprisonment. At the trial, the Commonwealth
attorney was permitted to testify as to the accused's having made this
offer, over the objection of the attorney for the defense. Accused was
found guilty, and on appeal, he was granted a new trial, the court
saying that admitting the testimony of the Commonwealth's attorney
was error. Bennett v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 333, 28 S. W. (2d) 24.
In the opinion, the court said that under the circumstances surrounding this 'conversation, it might be excluded on the ground of
privilege, and that there was grave error in the substance of the testimony, because offers of compromise and admissions made expressly for
that purpose cannot be proved against the party making them.
As to the general question of attorneys testifying, the court said
It -Was not approved, especially for a prosecuting attorney, except
where the necessity of circumstances required his testimony.
An examination of the cases indicates that this Is a fair statement of the general rule, and they throw some light upon the question
of the circumstances under which the testimony of attorneys Is admissible.
A former Kentucky decision held that privilege of professional
communications to an attorney does not apply to future transactions
when a client is contemplating crime or fraud. Cummings v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 301, 298 S. W. 943. In 1884 the Kentucky court said an
attorney is not incompetent to testify against the defendant by reason
of the fact that he is assisting in the prosecution. Letcher v. Commonwealth, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 305. Another Kentucky case held that the defendant was not entitled to object because his counsel, formerly city
attorney, was required to testify for the Commonwealth as to Investigations conducted by him. Alder v. Commonwealth, 286 S. W. 696, 215
Ky. 613.
In a South Dakota case, it was held that the testifying by a
prosecuting attorney as to a confession made to him and conducting
the trial at the same time was not error, it being necessary for him to
testify to the confession. State v. Magnuson, 46 S. D. 156, 191 N. W.
460.
A recent Wisconsin case held that the propriety of allowing a prosecuting attorney to testify Is a matter largely within the discretion
of the trial court, and permitting a district attorney to testify in corroboration of other witnesses as to statements made to him by de-

CASE CoMMENS
fendant's witness in conflict with the witness's testimony was not
error. Baumgartnerv. State. 223 N. W. 419 (Wis.).
A Texas case holds that exclusion of testimony of counsel for
accused that a witness for the state, in a private conversation, made a
different statement, was error, and the testimony should have been
admitted. Shannon v. State, 284 S. W. 586, 104 Tex. Cr. App. 483.
A 1928 Illinois decision held that an attorney in a cause is not
disqualified from testifying as a witness, and objection to his testifying
goes only to the credibility and not to the admissibility of his testimony. Bogart v. Brazer, 162 N. E. 877, 331 Ill. 160.
A Nebraska case, also in 1928, held that ordinarily an attorney is
a competent witness for a client, but if he testifies generally to the
merits of the case, it is unbecoming for him to examine witnesses or
address the jury. In re Brayer's Estate, 218 N. W. 746 (Neb.)
The general conclusion from the authorities and cases seems to
be that it is unbecoming and improper for an attorney to act as
counsel and witness unless necessity and justice demand it, but that
it is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court, and
unless this discretion has been exercised unwisely and prejudicially,
it is not sufficient ground for a reversal upon appeal, although it is
a practice to be discouraged.
G. B. F.
INmrurAwcE TAxrs-Gnrr n CoNTramL&TioN or Dn&TH.-Appellee's testatrix transferred $56,202.50 worth of securities to her daughter
within three years next before her death, and the State Tax Commission, acting under authority of Sec. 4281a-1, Subsec. 2, Kentucky Statutes, included this amount in fixing the amount of the estate for inheritance tax purposes. The statute referred to provides that every
transfer of property made within three years next before the donor's
death shall be construed to have been made in contemplation of death,
and shall be treated as a part of the estate of the decedent for inheritance tax purposes. Held, that part of the Kentucky Statutes (See.
4281a-1, Subsec. 2) was unconstitutional for reason that the Supreme
Court had, in the case of Schlesinger v. State of Wisconsin, 270 U. S.
230, declared a like statute in Wisconsin unconstitutional. State Taa
Commission v. Robinson's Executor, et al., 234 Ky. 415, 28 S. W. (2d)
491.
In the case of In re ,berling, 169 Wis. 432, 172 N. W. 734, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin had declared their law to be constitutional, and when the Schlesinger case came before it on appeal, the
doctrine of the Eberling case was reaffirmed, and the court said
among other things that though it was literally true that the legislature could not make a gift not made in contemplation of death a gift
made in contemplation of death, yet it could make all gifts made
within a certain period of time fall within a certain class for the
purpose of securing a practical administration of the inheritance tax
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law. provided that gifts of that class are usually and ordinarily of
the kind which the class calls for.
Mr. Justice McReynolds. in the majority opinion in the Schlesinger
case, in considering the opinion of the Wisconsin court, declared that
the classification of all gifts made within the six year period as gifts
made in contemplation of death, would be in plain conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment, in that it would be denying to those persons,
making gifts inter vivos, due process of law or equal protection of the
law, that the Federal Constitution cannot be so lightly treated, and
that the rights of persons making gifts not in contemplation of death
are superior to the supposed necessity of catching persons who might
make such gifts to avoid the inheritance tax laws.
In a dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Holmes declares that the time
in which the legislature might lay down a law within which it could
be presumed that gifts were made in contemplation of death was a
matter of degree about which reasonable men might disagree and that
it could not be said that six years was too remote. It is suggested in
43 A. L. R. i229 that the court in the Schlesinger case did not deny
the principle that the legislature might create a conclusive presumption that gifts made within a lesser period than six years, were made
in contemplation of death. The following observation on this point
was made by Holmes, J.: "If the time were six months instead of six
years I hardly think that the power of the state to pass the law
would be denied, as the difficulty of proof would warrant making the
presumption absolute."
In the instant case the Kentucky court does not say that three
years Is too long a time to raise a presumption that a gift made within
that time was made in contemplation of death, but satisfied itself with
the statement that for the reasons that the U. S. Supreme Court declared the Wisconsin statute unconstitutional, the Kentucky statute
is likewise unconstitutional.
J. K. L.
I

INSURANCE-COLLUSION BETwEEN

INSURED AND PASSENGER, IN AUTo-

mOBILE INsuANcE-Plaint ff in error issued a policy of Indemnity In-

surance to owner of automobile. Injured party, passenger in car, recovered judgment against insured without opposition. The defense interposed in this suit is that of collusion between insured and Injured
party. A clause of the policy made insurer liable for suits against insured.
Held, no error in refusing instruction on fraud and collusion,
since insured gave due notice of suit to insurer. Indemnity Ins. Co. of
North America v. Lee, 24 S. W. (2d) 278, 232 Ky. 556.
The general rule of liability of the insurer under such a policy
is stated in 14 R. C. L. 63 as follows: "It should be noted that If
a person enters into a contract of indemnity, whereby he expressly
agrees to become responsible for the results of litigation, or, if by the
operation of law, such a responsibility is cast upon him without any
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agreement, he will, in the absence of fraud or collusion, be conclusively
bound by the judgment rendered." See note in 22 A. S. R. 204 citing
a number of cases. United States Casualty Co. v. Drew, 5 Fed.
(2d) 498; Frances v. London Guarantee and Accident Co., 100 Vt. 425,
138 AtI. 780; United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Williams, 129
Atl. 660, 148 Aid. 289; Roth v. National Automobile Atut. Casualty Co.,
195 N. Y. S. 865.
Courts generally hold that the injured party is In no better position than the insured, and since fraud and collusion would prevent the
latter's recovery this is likewise a good defense against the injured
party. Ohrback v. Preferred Ace. Ins. Co. of N. Y., 237 N. Y. S. 494;
Conroy v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 140 Atl. 905, 292 Pa 219;
Rohlf v G~eat American Mut. Indemnity Co., 161 N. E. 232, 27 Ohio
App. 208; Schoenfeld v. N. J. Fidelity and Plate Glass Ins. Co., 197 N.
Y. S. 606; Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 213 N. Y. S. 522;
Bassi v. Bassi, 205 N. W. 947, 165 Minn. 100.
In Collins' Ex'rs v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 170 Ky. 27, 185 S. W.
112, the court held that fraud and collusion on part of insured in enabling the injured party to recover a judgment against the insured
was a good defense in an action by the latter against the insurer.
Most of the cases cited above show a policy of insurance where the
insured agrees to act in good faith in helping the insurer defend suits.
The courts have unanimously held that where there is sufficient evidence to show bad faith, and hence by implication, fraud and collusion, neither the injured party nor the insured can recover. This is a
sound result. Certainly, a breach by the insured, acting in collusion
with the injured party should discharge the insurer from liability,
and, as the courts so hold, the injured party should stand in no better
relation than the insured under such circumstances.
J. C. B.
PARTNERSHIPS-PARTN-- As AGENT FOR THE Fmi.-A and B agreed
In writing that A should buy certain farm lands for their joint account and hold title to the same, and manage the farms for the firm.
B was to contribute to the purchase price. A borrowed some money
from a bank which was used upon said farms to erect buildings. B
became dissatisfied with the arrangement and brought an action to
cancel the original contract under which they had been operating and
to compel an accounting by A. Among other things B contended that
the money borrowed by A in his own name and used on the farms was
a personal obligation of A. The court held the relation a partnership,
and that money borrowed by A in his own name but used in the promotion of the partnership business was the obligation of the partnership. Ross v. Ross' Admr., 232 Ky. 583, 24 S. W. (2d) 287.
In holding that one partner was the agent of the partnership in
the transaction of the partnership business as to all acts within the
scope of the agreement, the Court of Appeals, in the instant case,
merely followed a well established rule in Kentucky. Barker & Co. v.
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Mann, Bennett & Co., 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 672, 96 Amer. Dec. 373; George
Bohon Co. v. Moren & Siplpe, 151 Ky. 811, 152 S. W. 944; Power Grocery
Co. v. Hinton, 187 Ky. 171, 218 S. W. 1013; Carter v. Tucker, 205 Ky.
438, 266 S. W. 438.
The rule, it is said, arises from the doctrine of mutual agency, each
partner being presumably the general agent for the others. Gilmore on
Partnership, p. 274.
The Kentucky rule is the general rule both in the other states
and in the U. S. Supreme Court. Craig v. Warner, 216 Mass. 386, 103
N. E. 1032; Babcock v. Stewart, 58 Pa. 179; .ittle v. Britton, 189 Ala.
10, 66 So. 694; Stenian v. Tashjian, 178 Cal. 623, 174 Pac. 883; First
2ational Bank v. Farson, 226 N. Y. 218, 123 N. E. 490; Denney v.
London Assurance Co., 113 U. S. 51, 5 S. Ct. R. 341; Strang v. Bradner,
114 U. S. 555, 5 S. Ct. R. 1038.
That the money, in the instant case, was borrowed by one partner
in his own name does not relieve the other of his liability as a partner
when it is found that the obligation was a partnership debt. George
Bohon Co. v. Moren Sipple, 151 Ky. 811, 152 S. W. 944; Lawson v. Davis,
194 Ky. 67, 238 S. W. 402; S. L. Snyder Co. v. Abrams, 158 N. Y. S.
642, 98 Misc. Rep. 225; Victor v. Spaulding, 202 Mass. 234, 88 N. E. 846;
Moore v. Thorpe, 133 Minn. 244, 158 N. W. 235; Farnsworthv. Union
Trust & Deposit Co., 128 C. C. A. 290, 211 Fed. 912.
Our court is in accord with the general rule and it has been conL. B. R.
sistent in its application thereof.
±mATIoN.-Although defendant furnished
PuBic Un-irrms-Discr
electricity to others similarly situated, it refused to supply plaintiff on
the ground that the line over which electricity was carried to the mining camp near which plaintiff lived was controlled by defendant only
under a contract with a coal company which had constructed the line,
and that it could not supply others with power without the consent' of
the coal company. The court held that defendant, a public utility
clothed with the power of eminent domain under a statute, cannot discriminate between persons similarly situated, and awarded judgment
for the plaintiff. Smith v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 233 Ky. 68, 24 S. W.
(2d) 928.
There is sufficient analogy between the instant case and that of
Bedford-Bowling Green Stone Co. v. Oman, 115 Ky. 369, 73 S. W. 1038,
which was cited in the above decision, to say that the court has merely
reiterated the holding of the former case, which held that a railroad
could not refuse to receive freight from a third party whose quarry
was on a switch controlled by the railroad under a contract with the
builder of the switch, who had constructed the branch primarily for
his own use. This principle has been consistently applied by the Kentucky court in preventing unjust discrimination by public utilities.
L. d N. R. B. Co. v. Pittsburg d Kanawha Coal Go., 111 Ky. 960, 64 S.
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W. 969; Barrigerv. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 196 Ky. 268, 244 S.
W. 690.
Decisions of other states and the federal courts, forcing public
utilities to deal fairly with their customers, are in accord with the
Kentucky decision. Snell v. Clinton Electric Co., 196 ill. 626, 63 N. E.
1082; Morgan Run Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 98
Ohio State Reports 218, 120 N. E. 295; McCoy v. C. ., St. L. & C. R. R.
Co., 13 Fed. 5; Bryant v. Western Union Tel. Co., 17 Fed. 289; B. & 0.
R. R. Co. v. Adams Express Co., 22 Fed. 409; Cutting v FloridaRailway
& Navigation Co., 43 Fed. 747.
The attitude of the Supreme Court of the United States toward
the rights and duties of public utilities can be found in a number of
decisions which prohibit discrimination. L. & N. R. R. Co. v. U. S., 238
U. S. 1; Atch. T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Denver & N. 0. R. R. Co., 110 U.
S. 667, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; U. P. R. R. Co. v. Goodridge, 149 U. S. 680,
13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 970. In the latter case the railroad attempted to
justify a rebate in rates by a contract with a company which furnished
coal to the railroad The court said: "To hold a defense thus pleaded
to be valid would open the door to the grossest frauds upon the law
and practically enable the railroad to avail itself of any consideration
for a rebate which it considers sufficient and to agree with a favored
customer upon some fabricated claim."
However, the rule against discrimination does not preclude reasonable contracts between the utility and customers who occupy special
positions as distinguished from the general consumer. Warmack v.
Major Stave Co., 132 Ark. 173, 200 S. W. 799; Interstate Commerce
Commission v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 844.
In view of the dependence of the consumer upon the utilities and
the evil influence of discrimination upon a competitive industrial society, it is not surprising to find that the courts extend the rule against
discrimination to include such cases as the present one.
C. S.
REAL PRoPEnTr-TnEspAss To CAE-INsPEcTIlo.-Original application for a writ of prohibition to prevent the county judge of Edmonson
County, Kentucky, from proceeding with a survey which he ordered
made of the cave belonging to plaintiff, in order to ascertain its true
boundaries and to see if it extends under the farm of one Lee. Lee
sued the plaintiff here in trespass, alleging that Edwards' cave, the
Great Onyx Cave, was in part under the farm of Lee. (Edwards v. Lee,
230 Ky. 375, 19 S. W. (2d) 992.) Held: Writ not granted. The court
gives the maxim, "Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad
inferos," Coke on Litt. Sec. 4a, as still the law of this state. "He who
owns the surface owns up to the sky and down to the depths." Edwards
v. Sims, 232 Ky. 791, 248 S. W. (2d) 619.
The only way to determine whether plaintiff here is trespassing
under the farm of Lee in the exploitation of his cave is by a survey.
Courts of equity have frequently ordered the inspection and survey of
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coal and other mines as an inherent right. Their jurisdiction seems to
be based on the theory of "natural justice," and analogies of rights
and powers conferred on a court of equity to give more perfect justice
than can be had in a court of law. The Kentucky court makes mines
analogous to the cave boundaries in question here.
Writing of inspections generally, and defending their use as op
posed to the objection that they deprive the owner of his property and
the use thereof, the most often pleaded objection to inspections and
surveys, the court in Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining and Milling Co.,
152 U. S. 160, says: "By an inspection neither the title nor the general
use is taken, and all that can be said is that there is a temporary and
limited interruption of the exclusive use." This Supreme Court case
also holds that a survey may be ordered made "when there is a real
necessity for inspection or where the facts to be determined can not
well be determined by the ordinary methods."
But in a well-considered opinion Judge Logan dissents from the
rest of the court as to the "Ad Coelum" rule; he cites no authorities for
his position, and it is believed that as a common law rule the "ad
coelum et ad inferos" rule has been as rigidly adhered to as any other
formulated as a general proposition. See note and cases cited in 32
Har. L. Rev. 659. The dissent rests on the ground that there can be no
profit for the plaintiff Lee should the cave be in fact partly under his
farm. This situation does not affect minerals or coal, but is a business
of showing sight-seers the wonders of the cave he has discovered, explored and made known thru his own advertising efforts. Further, the
only known entrance to the cave is on Edwards' land, and there could
be no profit to the adjoining landowner should the cave be partly under
his land. The dissent points out the daily trespass of airplanes above
us, and reminds us that we cannot stop the planes, nor recover damages
for the harmless trespass above. So why should not the "ad coelum et
ad inferos" rule be dead and unless as to the owner of the land adjoining the cave here, so long as his surface estate is not disturbed nor
interferred with, and he can not possibly profit from its presence.
J. H. C.
TAXATIoN-ExEwiTION OF CuiA rriEs LOOATED OuTsIDE o1r STATE.Appellant was a public library incorporated in Ohio and owning a
farm in Grant County, Kentucky, which it claimed was exempt from
taxation under Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution allowing exemption to institutions of purely public charity. Held, that such farm
was not exempt, because it was not actually used for charitable purposes, and because, even If the charitable character of its owner is
conceded, such owner is a foreign corporation. Lloyd Library and
Yfuseum v. Chipman, 22 S. W. (2d) 597, 232 Kentucky 191.
The court approaches the case apparently from a aual viewpoint, first that of constitutional interpretation and second, that of
public policy. This means necessarily that the court must answer for
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itself "How far can we go in furtherance of a policy beneficial to the
general public, and yet remain within the limits prescribed by the
express words of the Constitution?" The Kentucky Constitution (Sec.
170) declares, in substance, there shall be exempt from taxation
institutions of purely public charity and institutions of education.
Nowhere does it limit this exemption to intrastate institutions. The
court, in two terse sentences, indicates its interpretation, expresses
its policy, answers its question and substantially decides the case.
"In its final analysis, an exemption is equivalent to an appropriation.
It was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution that Kentucky should make an appropriation for the benefit of foreign corporations that render no service to the state."
Upon casual consideration this decision seems a bit arbitrary,
especially so, since no authority is cited. However upon more thorough
study, it clearly appears that the decision is justified and any doubts
are easily and quickly dissipated by the abundance and tenor of authority on the subject in other jurisdictions.
"The statute must be understood to have exclusive reference to institutions created by the laws of the state, and not to foreign corporations that may choose to locate branches in this state." People,
ex rel. Huck v. Seamen's Friend Assn., 87 Ill. 246.
"It is the policy of the state to encourage benevolence and charity.
But It is not the proper function of the state to go outside its own
limits and devote its resources to support the cause of religion, education, or missions for the benefit of mankind at large." In re Prime,
136 N. Y. 347.
"Exemptions of charitable institutions relate only to domestic institutions of that class even if the word 'in the state' had been omitted
from the statute." Humphreys v. State, 70 Ohio St. 67. Statutes exempting persons and property from taxation are to be strictly construed against the exception. State v. Manchester Savings Bank, 71 N.
H. 535; Philips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 58 N. H. 306; In re Walker,
200 Ill. 566; Bangor v. Rising Virtue Lodge, 73 Me. 434; Thurston
County v. Sisters of Charity, 14 Wash. 264; Y. M. C. A. v. Patterson,61
N. J. L. 420; Chicago to Use of Schools v. Chicago, 207 Ill. 37; Vol. 1,
Cooley on Taxation (3rd Ed.), p. 357.
This having been settled, there was one other question for the
court, which is easy of solution and almost obvious in comparison with
the first question, and this is, Is this farm a purely charitable or educational institution? The court said in discussing this phase of the case,
"In the conduct of this farm no teachers are employed, and no system
of educational, moral, or physical training is carried on by the appellant. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the farm . . . is
either a charitable, or educational institution, and since this' is so,
the charitable or educational character of the owner is immaterial."
Similarly other courts have decided, giving ample support to the position of the court in its attitude toward this phase, "Whether property
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is used exclusively for charitable purposes within the Constitution exempting such property from taxation depends not on the character of
the corporation or the association owning the property, but, regardless
of the character of the owner, on the exclusive use of the property
for public charity." Grand Lodge F. and A. M. v. Taylor, 146 Ark. 316,
226 S. W. 129.
"Whether property is exempt from taxation because of being
used
for strictly charitable purposes depends on the use made of it rather
than on the charitable character of the owner." Chaffee County v.
Denver & R. G. R. R. Co. Employers' Relief Ass'n, 70 Col. 592, 203 Pac.
850. "Land not actually and exclusively used for charitable purposes,
but merely held under deed of trust providing for such use in the
future Is not exempt from taxation." In re Allerton, 296 Ill. 340, 129 N.
E. 801.
"Where exemption from taxation is conferred upon property rather
than its owner, because its use and product is given over to charity,
the character of the owner as a charitable society is Immaterial."
Merrick Lodge 31 .1. 0. 0. F. v. City of Lexington, 175 Kentucky 275,
194 S. W. 92.
H. T. W.
WJrms-PREcAOnY TnusTs.--The defendant's wife died possessed
of considerable property which she disposed of by will in the following
language and written in her own handwriting: "I wish to will my
property to my husband, asking that he in turn leave it equally to
my two children." The question for the court's decision was whether
the husband took the property in fee or only a life estate with remainder over to the children. Held, that by the terms of the will a
precatory trust was created for the reason that the will expressed
merely the wife's wishes and that one wish was entitled to as much consideration as the other. Commonwealth ex rel. State Tax Commission
v. Willson's Admr., 21 S. W. (2d) 814. 231 Ky. 497.
No technical language is necessary to the creation of a trust,
either by deed or by will. Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 310. If a trust
was intended by the testator, precatory words are sufficient to create
it. Perry on Trusts, Sec. 114; Bohon v. Barrett, 79 Ky. 378. A trust
will be created by precatory words, if they be not so modified by the
context of the will as to amount to no more then mere suggestion to
be acted on or not, according to the caprice of the immediate devisee,
or negatived by other expressions indicating a contrary Intention,
and the subject and object be sufficiently certain. Bohon v. Barrett,
supra.
It was the policy of the early English courts to construe the
slightest wish or request of a testator as creating a trust, but the
modern tendency is to give to such words only their natural meaning unless it appears from other parts of the will or from any evidence that is proper, that the testator intended them to be mandatory.
Wood v. Wood, 127 Ky. 514, 74 S. W. 247. Later Kentucky cases adopt
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the rule that the words of the testator must be construed as mandatory.
Before a court will declare a trust to exist and enforce it, three things
must be shown: (1) the words of the testator must be construed as
mandatory; (2) the person intended to be the beneficiary must be
certain; and (3) the subject to which the obligation relates must be
certain. 'Wood v. Wood, 127 Ky. 514, supra.
The modern doctrine is that the only ground upon which precatory words will be held to create a trust is that the testator actually
intended them to be mandatory upon the devisee or legatee.' In other
words, expressions must be used which are not only imperative In
form, but imperative in the meaning and intent of the testator. Hopki s v. Giunt, 111 Pa. 287; Post v. Moore, 181 N. Y. 15; Prattv. Shepard,
88 Md. 610; Ensley v. Ensley. 105 Tenn. 107.
A circumstance sometimes relied upon as indicating that precatory expressions were used with intent to create a trust is that the
person to whom they were addressed is the spouse of the testator to
whom It Is not to be expected that commands would be expressed In
such forcible language as against strangers. Warner v. Bates, 98 Mass.
274; Murphy v. Corbin, 113 Mo. 112.
In the instant case the court was not faced with the problem of
determining whether precatory words were sufficient to create a trust
after an absolute gift had been made to the testator's husband, because
the words "I wish" relating to the bequest to the husband were no
more imperative and absolute than the word "asking" relating to the
creating of a trust for the children. 49 A. L. R. 43 at 84. Precatory
words were used in each instance and If mandatory in one instance,
they were mandatory in the other. Where a bequest is made by inflexible words and then a gift is made by flexible words, the court
Is then presented with the problem as to whether or not any effect
Is to be given to the latter bequest. In such cases the court will give
effect to the absolute gift if it can. The flexible term must give way
to the inflexible one, if inconsistent with it. Such was not the problem
in the instant case as flexible terms of bequest were used in each
Instance. Perry on Trusts, Sec. 114.
J. K. L.

